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A negative real interest rate has guaranteed macroeconomic equilibrium during every national 
emergency in the United States since the early 19
th century, except the Great Depression in the 
1930s when deflation interfered with the interest rate mechanism. During the Great Depression, the 
interest rate mechanism failed because the zero bound on the nominal interest rate implies that the 
real interest rate cannot be negative if there is deflation. This points to a monetary explanation of 
the Great Depression, and it suggests that central banks should suspend monetary policy rules that 
target inflation if there is an adverse political or economic shock that creates consumer pessimism.    
JEL classification: D91, E21, E52, G12, N21   1
One would expect that the severity of the Great Depression in the 1930s made it easy to discern 
its cause, but far from it! No consensus has emerged on the cause of the Great Depression from the 
writings of three generations of economists, starting with those who, like John Maynard Keynes, 
lived through it. Certainly, most economists agree that aggregate demand must have declined, but 
there is no agreement on the source of the decline in demand and why lower demand set into motion 
a disastrous downward spiral in economic activity from which there was seemingly no escape. 
Keynes’s view that a fall in investment spending reduced demand is still standing side by side with 
the hypothesis of Temin (1976) that autonomous consumption spending declined, and the hypothesis 
of Friedman and Schwartz (1956) who argued that a fall in the money stock lowered aggregate 
demand. Recently, even the consensus on the deficiency of aggregate demand has been challenged 
by Prescott (1999), Cole and Ohanian (1999, 2004), and Chari et al. (2002) who maintain that New 
Deal changes in labor market institutions accounted for the persistence of the Great Depression.   
This paper applies the tools of dynamic macroeconomic analysis to the Great Depression in the 
1930s. The focus is on the first order optimum condition of consumers, which relates consumption 
growth to the real interest rate. Using American data, the Great Depression is compared with other 
severe economic downturns since the early 19
th century. The main puzzle is that there was no 
obvious economic shock to the US economy in the 1930s, whereas there were strong shocks that 
could plausibly have given rise to economic depressions before and after the 1930s. Why has the 
Great Depression remained unique? Why did an elusive shock trigger an economic crisis in the 
1930s, while easily identifiable shocks during national emergencies affected the US economy much 
less earlier and later? In this paper it is argued that a negative real interest rate guaranteed macro-
economic equilibrium during every emergency, except the Great Depression when deflation 
accounted for a positive real interest rate. During the Great Depression, the interest rate mechanism 
failed to produce a macroeconomic equilibrium because the zero bound on the nominal interest rate   2
implies that the real interest rate can be negative only if there is inflation. The finding that inflation is 
needed to prevent a depression if the equilibrium real interest rate is negative has important 
implications for the conduct of contemporary monetary policy. Central banks should abandon 
inflation targets if an economic shock induces an expected decline in consumption that requires a 
negative real interest rate. 
Section 1 reviews the theory of consumer behavior in dynamic macroeconomic models. 
Section 2 provides a historical narrative of the behavior of the real interest rate in the United States 
since the early 19
th century. The historical analysis makes two assumptions: (1) the consumption 
Euler equation represents a macroeconomic equilibrium relationship between the real interest rate 
and consumption growth, and (2) expected consumption fell and the volatility of consumption rose 
during national emergencies. Section 3 shows how the monetary standard conditioned the inflation 
process. The econometric analysis, which is provided in the next two sections, supports the 
hypothesis that there exists an equilibrium relationship between the real interest rate and 
consumption growth. In Section 4 the nonlinear consumption Euler equation is estimated, and in 
Section 5 the log-linear functional form is considered. The second moments, which enter the log-
linear Euler equation, are estimated using the EWMA/ARCH methodology. Section 6 concludes with 
a word of caution against the use of monetary policy rules in the presence of adverse political and 
economic shocks that give rise to pessimistic consumer expectations that necessitate a negative real 
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1. Consumer Behavior   
Consider the decision problem of a consumer who decides on consumption in two time periods. 
The optimum condition, which is known as the consumption Euler equation, is:  
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u'(Ct) is the marginal utility of consumption in time period t. To illustrate, assume that the real 
interest rate r equals the subjective discount rate ρ. Then, it is optimal to keep consumption constant 
because the marginal utility of consumption must be the same in each time period. The gap between 
r and ρ determines the optimal time path of consumption. When r exceeds ρ, consumption grows 
because marginal utility in period t+1 must be less than marginal utility in period t. This assumes that 
marginal utility falls when consumption increases. Of course, the consumer postpones consumption 
if the real return on saving exceeds the subjective discount rate. Similarly, the consumer reduces 
saving if the real interest rate is less than the subjective discount rate.    
Equation (1) can be applied to the representative consumer in a dynamic macroeconomic model. 
Then, the equation includes two endogenous variables, the real interest rate and the growth rate of 
per capita consumption,  t t C C / 1 + . To quantify the relationship between the real interest rate and 
consumption growth, it is necessary to specify the period utility function. The CRRA utility function, 
) 1 /( ) ( 1 θ θ − = −
t t C C u , is compatible with the long-run behavior of key macroeconomic variables 
(See Prescott 2006). The parameter θ, which is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, determines 
the degree of diminishing marginal utility. Substituting marginal utility,  '( ) , tt uC C
θ − =  into 














r 1 ) 1 ( 1          ( 3 )    4





+ =−  for the growth rate of consumption, this can be written as: 
  θ ρ ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 g r + + = +          ( 4 )  
Since r, ρ and g are all small, applying logarithms yields the approximation: 
  g r θ ρ + ≈           ( 5 )  
Optimal consumer behavior implies that the real interest rate equals the sum of the subjective 
discount rate and the product of the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the growth rate of 
consumption. Since the parameter θ  is positive, there exists a positive relationship between the real 
interest rate and consumption growth. In the steady state, consumption is constant and the real 
interest rate is approximately equal to the subjective discount rate. In this paper special attention is 
paid to situations in which a fall in consumption requires a negative real interest rate. For example, 
the equilibrium real interest rate is minus 13 percent if ρ is 2 percent per year, θ equals 1.5, and 
consumption falls by 10 percent per year.  
Inflation renders the real interest rate uncertain if interest rates are defined in nominal terms in 
debt contracts. If both the real interest rate and future consumption are uncertain, the consumption 
Euler equation is: 
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Using the same utility function as before, the optimum condition is:    5
(1 )(1 ) 1 [] t rg E
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The expectation operator should not be written into the nonlinear expression on the right-hand 
side of equation (8). Instead, Romer (2006, p. 369) computes the expectation of a second order 
Taylor series approximation of  θ − + + ) 1 )( 1 ( g r around r = 0 and g = 0. Solving for the expected real 
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This equation shows the equilibrium relationship between the real interest rate and consumption 
growth if both quantities are uncertain. The expected real interest rate is positively related to the 
expected rate of consumption growth and the covariance between the real interest rate and con-
sumption growth, while the variance of consumption growth is negatively associated with the real 
interest rate. Consumers demand a high real interest rate if the covariance between the real interest 
rate and consumption growth is positive because bonds are an ineffective vehicle for consumption 
smoothing in this situation. The variance of consumption growth interacts negatively with the real 
interest rate because an increase in consumption volatility induces precautionary saving, putting 
downward pressure on the real interest rate.  
From 1831 to 2004, the growth rate of American per capita consumption was 2 percent per year, 
the covariance between the real interest rate and consumption growth was 0.0002, and the variance 
of consumption growth was 0.002. Plausible parameter values of the utility function are ρ = 2 
percent and θ  = 1.5. With these figures, equation (9) yields a mean real interest rate of 4.28 percent, 
which is not far from the historical average of 3.57 percent. It seems that the covariance and variance 
terms do not matter much in equation (9), at least in the long-run. The covariance term increases the 
mean real interest rate by only 0.03 percent, and the variance term reduces it by 0.75 percent. 
However, this estimate of the average real interest rate is based upon unconditional moments,   6
whereas equation (9) really holds for conditional moments. The conditional moments of macro-
economic time series, including the real interest rate and consumption growth, depend on economic 
conditions. Therefore, it is possible that the second moments in equation (9) have a sizeable effect on 
the expected real interest rate during a national emergency, even if their long-run effect is negligible. 
In Section 5, the conditional second moments are estimated using the EWMA/ARCH methodology.   
 
2. The American Real Interest Rate 
The theory of consumer behavior predicts that the real interest rate is negative during a national 
emergency that affects consumption. A fall in consumption requires a negative real interest rate in 
equation (5), and a fall in expected consumption reduces the expected real interest rate in 
equation (9). The expected real interest rate also falls because the conditional variance of con-
sumption growth increases during a crisis. As will be seen in Section 5, the sign of the conditional 
covariance between the real interest rate and consumption growth depends on the nature of a crisis. 
In Figure 1, the real interest rate is the short-term interest rate minus the inflation rate in the 
preceding year. The shaded areas indicate the most severe national emergencies that have affected 
the United States since the early 19
th century: the Civil War (1861-65), World War I (1914-18), the 
Great Depression (1929-33), World War II (1939-45), the Korean War (1950-53), the oil crises 
(1973-74 and 1979-80), and the attack on the World Trade Center that led to the US invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq (since 2001). The real interest rate became negative during every major war, it 
turned negative when deflation ceased in the 1930s, and it was negative during the oil crises. At the 
same time, the real interest rate became negative without obvious national distress only once, during 
the recession in 1957-58. The Vietnam War (1964-75) did not lead to a negative real interest rate 
because the United States was drawn into it gradually over a lengthy period of time. Therefore, the   7
conditional moments of consumption growth remained unaffected. Table 1 summarizes all national 




Figure 1. Real Interest Rate
1831-2004











Figure 2. Inflation Rate
1831 - 2004













Sources: See the Appendix.  
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It is easy to calibrate equation (9) with realistic parameter values so that plausible assumptions 
on the conditional moments produce the observed real interest rate during the national emergencies 
in Table 1. During the Civil War, the minimum of the real interest rate occurred in 1864, when it fell 
to minus 19.0 percent. In the same year, real per capita GNP, which serves as proxy for consumption, 
dropped by 11.1 percent. If ρ = 0.02 and θ  = 1.5, equation (5) predicts a real interest rate of minus 
14.7 percent. From 1831 to 2004, the standard deviation of consumption growth was 4.5 percent and 
the covariance between the real interest rate and consumption growth was close to zero. Assuming 
the conditional standard deviation was twice as high in 1864 and neglecting the covariance, 
equation (9) predicts a real interest rate of minus 17.7 percent. The equations also work well at the 
end of the sample period. During the first oil crisis in 1974, real per capita consumption fell by 2.3 
percent. Making the same assumptions as before, equation (5) predicts a real interest rate of minus 
1.5 percent and equation (9) yields minus 4.5 percent. In fact, the real interest rate was minus 3.1 
percent, which lies between these two estimates.  
Negative real interest rates are a key feature of American business cycle history. The real 
interest rate was negative in 35 years during the 174 years covered by Figure 1. Macroeconomic 
equilibrium requires a negative real interest rate if the economy is hit by a strong shock that affects 
consumption. During wars and national emergencies, people saved because they expected that 
consumption would fall and the conditional variance of consumption growth was high. People who 
face adverse economic prospects save in order to maintain consumption. There is an incentive to 
save because the expected marginal utility of future consumption is high if expected consumption is 
low and uncertain. During wars and national emergencies, the incentive to save was so strong that 
there would have been excess saving and a corresponding excess supply of commodities without a 
negative real interest rate. For this reason, negative real interest rates prevented the recessions during 







Table 1. National Emergencies and the Real Interest Rate*  
   Duration   Minimum  real     Year 
interest rate 
  1. Civil War     1861-1865    -19.0%     1864 
  2. World War I  1914-1918    -12.5%     1917 
    USA:  1917-1918   
  3. World War II  1939-1945     -9.8%      1942 
   USA:  1941-1945 
4. Korean War   1950-1953    -6.5%      1951 
5. 1
st Oil Crises  1973-74    -3.1%      1974 
6. 2
nd Oil Crisis  1979-80    -1.9%      1980 
7. Afghanistan/Iraq  since 2001    -1.3%      2004 






   10
The history of the Great Depression in the 1930s confirms that negative real interest rates were 
instrumental in preventing more depressions in American economic history. Since real per capita 
consumption dropped by 10.1 percent in 1931 and 11.5 percent in 1932, it is likely that expected 
consumption fell and the conditional variance of consumption increased. Using equation (9) with the 
same parameter values and second moments as for 1864, the real interest rate should have been 
minus 16.2 percent in 1931 and minus 18.2 percent in 1932. Instead, the real interest rate was 
strongly positive in these years, namely 11.0 and 13.1 percent. This is a gap of 27.2 percent in 1931 
and 31.3 percent in 1932! Clearly, the positive real interest rate that prevailed during the Great 
Depression was not an equilibrium rate. The finding that the real interest rate exceeded the 
equilibrium rate by a wide margin gives credence to the Keynesian view that saving was excessive 
during the Great Depression, although Keynes attributed this more to a decline in investment than to 
an increase in saving. But Temin (1976) has a strong case that the Great Depression was caused by 
insufficient consumption. Romer (1990) and Greasley, Madsen and Oxley (2001), who consider the 
consumption hypothesis, use stock market volatility as a measure of consumer expectations after the 
stock market crash in 1929. Weder and Harrison (2006) compute a consumer confidence index that is 
based on the spread between high risk and low risk corporate bonds. In this paper, consumer 
uncertainty is measured directly, using the conditional variance of consumption growth.      
During the Great Depression, the interest rate mechanism broke down because a negative real 
interest rate can be achieved only if there is inflation. It is well known that the nominal interest rate 
cannot be negative in a monetary economy. The real return on money is the negative of the inflation 
rate (-π) and the real return on bonds is the nominal interest rate minus the inflation rate (R-π). It is 
not worthwhile to hold bonds if the nominal interest rate is negative because the real return on 
money would exceed the real return on bonds at any inflation rate. The fact that the nominal interest   11
rate cannot be negative implies that a negative real interest rate can prevail only if there is inflation.
1 
The crucial difference between the national emergencies and the Great Depression is that there was 
moderate to high inflation during the former, while prices fell during the latter. During the national 
emergencies, inflation made it possible that the negative equilibrium real interest rate, which was 
required by pessimistic consumer expectations, was indeed realized. During the Great Depression, 
the interest rate mechanism failed to achieve macroeconomic equilibrium because the nominal 
interest rate could not fall further and deflation produced a positive real interest rate.
2 
 
3. Monetary Standard 
Figure 2 shows that there is a close correspondence between national emergencies and peaks in 
inflation. The annual inflation rate reached 26.4 percent in 1864, 17.8 percent in 1918, 10.5 percent 
in 1942, 8.0 percent in 1951, 11.0 percent in 1974, 13.5 percent in 1980, and 3.4 percent in 2005. 
The inflation process was conditioned by the monetary standard. The gold standard is incompatible 
with a flexible inflation rate, whereas the monetary authority is free to inflate in a paper standard. 
Although the United States did not change the official gold price from 1837 to 1933, the gold 
standard was not always fully operational.
3  
To finance the Civil War, the Union issued paper money, the so-called greenbacks, and it sold 
government bonds to national banks, which held them as legal reserves against their bank notes. The 
expansion of the supply of greenbacks and national bank notes generated inflation during the Civil 
War. During the first three years of World War I, it was easy for the United States, which was still 
                                                 
1 Since  0 ≥ R , r = R-π < 0 requires π > 0. 
2 Eggertsson and Woodford (2003, 2004) show that there is the risk of an economic collapse if the 
zero bound on the nominal interest rate is binding.  
3 Friedman and Schwartz (1963) pay close attention to the institutional restrictions that conditioned 
US monetary policy and inflation.   12
neutral, to maintain the gold standard because European gold flowed across the Atlantic to pay for 
armaments and strategic raw materials. But the influx of gold led to an expansion of the American 
money supply that caused inflation. After entering the war in 1917, the United States ran a budget 
deficit that was partly monetized by the Federal Reserve. This produced more inflation and a loss of 
official gold reserves. As a consequence, the United States restricted the export of gold, undercutting 
the gold standard. During World War II, the gold standard was not operational and, as during the 
Civil War and in 1917-18, inflation was fueled by the printing press. After World War II, the Bretton 
Woods international monetary agreement linked all countries indirectly to gold through fixed 
exchange rates with the US dollar, which was defined in gold. Unlike American residents, foreign 
governments had the right to exchange dollars for gold at the US Treasury. This arrangement gave 
the United States some leeway in monetary policy because foreign governments were expected to 
exercise restraint in the demand for American gold during emergencies. The Bretton Woods system 
was sufficiently flexible to absorb the spike in inflation during the Korean War, but American 
inflation went on for too long in the 1960s and the system collapsed in 1971. Since then, national 
paper standards have given central banks control of the inflation rate.  
The restoration of the gold standard after Word War I restricted the conduct of monetary policy 
in the interwar period. The United States abolished the export restriction on gold in 1919, and the 
international gold standard had been restored by the mid-1920s. Therefore, the world entered the 
Great Depression with a monetary system that did not allow for inflation when a negative real 
interest rate was required for macroeconomic equilibrium. Central bankers, who were impervious to 
the social cost of falling output and high unemployment, embraced deflation in order to bring 
commodity prices in line with the official gold price. In the United States the deflationary process 
ended only when Franklin D. Roosevelt abandoned the gold standard after taking office in 1933. Not 
surprisingly, consumer pessimism persisted for several years and the real interest rate became   13
belatedly negative in 1934 (Figure 1). This analysis implies that there was a macroeconomic 
disequilibrium during the Great Depression, whereas the economic contractions during the wartime 
emergencies and oil crises were equilibrium responses of the economy to exogenous shocks. The 
inability of the economy to achieve a new macroeconomic equilibrium, which was caused by the 
failure of the interest rate mechanism to equate saving and investment, explains the unusual severity 
of the Great Depression.  
 
4. Econometric Analysis 
Many empirical studies have been conducted that yield plausible parameter values for the 
representative consumer’s utility function. This suggests that the consumption Euler equation 
represents a macroeconomic equilibrium relationship that links the real interest rate with the growth 
rate of real per capita consumption. In this section, the parameters of the utility function are 
estimated with annual data on the real interest rate and consumption growth from 1831 to 2004. 
Before 1920, GDP growth serves as proxy for consumption growth. This sample period is much 
longer than those of earlier studies, which use monthly and quarterly data from the second half of the 
20
th century. The advantage of the longer sample period is that it covers the Civil War and both 
World Wars as well as the financial crises in the second half of the 19
th century, which all had a 
strong impact on the real interest rate and consumption. The estimated subjective discount rate and 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion are close to those in earlier studies. Thus, the analysis of 
historical data confirms that the consumption Euler equation has provided an equilibrium 
relationship between the real interest rate and consumption growth during national emergencies since 
1831. 
The following arguments pin down the values of the parameters of the representative utility 
function. Equations (5) and (9) imply that the subjective discount rate equals the real interest rate   14
when real per capita consumption is constant. Therefore, the low real interest rates that prevail in 
countries that are close to a steady state – for example Japan and Switzerland in the 1990s – suggest 
that ρ must be low, perhaps two percent per year or less. A similar argument does not apply to the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, for any value of θ  is compatible with a steady state. But values 
between one and four yield a plausible marginal rate of substitution between consumption in two 
successive years if real per capita consumption grows at two percent per year, which is the average 
rate of growth from 1831 to 2004. Setting ρ = 0.02, θ  = 1.5 and Ct+1/Ct = 1.02, the marginal rate of 
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A marginal rate of substitution of 0.952 implies that the consumer would agree to trade one unit 
of current consumption for 1/0.952 = 1.05 units of future consumption. Similarly, the consumer asks 
for 1.061 units of future consumption if θ = 2, and for 1.104 units of future consumption if θ  = 4. 
Cochrane (2005, Ch. 1) shows that the inverse of the marginal rate of substitution is the riskfree 
interest rate (gross return). Since the riskfree interest rate is low, most macroeconomists use values 
of θ  at the lower end of the range from 1 to 4. For example, Prescott (2006) sets θ  = 1; Attanasio 
and Low (2004) work with θ  = 1.5, and Walsh (2003, Ch. 2) adopts θ  = 2 as benchmark. Analyzing 
the behavior of the saving rate, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, Ch. 2) conclude that θ  must lie 
between 2 and 4. Therefore, Barro (2006) sets θ  equal to 3 and 4 in a model that deals with the 
equity premium puzzle. These are high values for macroeconomists, but they are close to those used 
by financial economists. Shiller (2003, p. 86), for example, computes a marginal rate of substitution 
                                                 
4 The marginal rate of substitution is derived from the utility function U(Ct,Ct+1) =  1 () ( ) , tt uC uC β + +  
where β = 1/(1+ρ).    15
(stochastic discount factor) with θ  = 3, and the option-implied coefficients of relative risk aversion 
of Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004, p. 429) lie between about 2 and 10.  
Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1984) first applied the generalized method of moments (GMM) to 
the nonlinear consumer Euler equation (4). Using monthly data from 1959 to 1978, they estimated 
several models with an increasing number of lags on instruments. They found that the annualized ρ 
lies between 0.6 percent and 9.8 percent and θ  is between 0.35 and 1. The annual data that are used 
in this study provide a similar range for both parameters. Table 2 presents estimates for three time 
periods: 1831-2004, 1831-1929, and 1934-2004. The depression years from 1930 to 1934 are 
excluded in all three regressions, including the one covering the entire time period from 1831 to 
2004, because during the Great Depression there was a macroeconomic disequilibrium that was 
incompatible with the consumption Euler equation. The instruments include two lags of the inflation 
rate and two lags of consumption growth. The estimate of ρ is 6.63 percent before the Great 
Depression and is insignificantly different from zero afterwards. The decline in ρ accounts for the 
secular fall in the real interest rate, which can be seen in Figure 1. The estimate of θ  is less than one 













    Table 2. Nonlinear Least Squares - Estimated by GMM     
     Equation:  0 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 = − + + + − − θ ρ g r     
  _________________________________________________________ 
 
    Parameter               1831-2004  1831-1929       1934-2004 
  _________________________________________________________ 
 
    Discount rate (ρ)   -0.0211
# 0.0663    -0.0078
# 
      (0.0171)  (0.0173)  (0.0108) 
  
    Coefficient of relative   2.9495   0.1684
# 0.7342 
     risk aversion (θ )    (0.9763) (0.6395) (0.3262) 
    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
  J(3)
       0.6462   2.9935   3.2986 
      (0.8858)  (0.3926)  (0.3478) 
  _________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:  
The exogenous and predetermined variables include two lags of the 
inflation rate and two lags of consumption growth.  
The standard errors of coefficients are shown in brackets. Coefficients that 
are not significant at the ten percent level are marked with the superscript 
#. To correct for serial correlation, the standard errors are based on a 
Newey-West covariance matrix that was estimated with four lags. The 
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5. Conditional Second Moments 
The main advantage of the regression in Table 2 is that it does not require the conditional 
variance of consumption and the conditional covariance between consumption and the real interest 
rate. The catch is that the consumption Euler equation (4) is nonlinear, and nonlinear GMM leads to 
inconsistent estimates in the presence of measurement error. The next regression uses estimates of 
the second moments as regressors in the log-linear consumption Euler equation (9). The standard 
theory of measurement error applies to this equation because it is linear in the coefficients.
5 
Two models are used to estimate the second moments: a univariate EWMA model and a 
bivariate EWMA model, which was adapted from a multivariate GARCH(1,1) model that was 
proposed by Engle (2002). The univariate model yields estimates of the conditional variances of 
consumption growth and the real interest rate, and the bivariate model adds the conditional 
covariance between the two variables. The estimated variances are identical in the univariate and 
bivariate models. The GARCH(1,1) model assumes that the variance is mean reverting, but the 
EWMA model does not. As seen in Figure 3, the variances of consumption growth and the real 
interest rate do not return to a stable long-term value. Since there is no mean reversion, the EWMA 
model is preferable to the GARCH(1,1) model.
6 The regression output of the volatility models is 




                                                 
5 Since second moments are not readily available, the simple log-linear equation (5) is often 
estimated. Then, ρ is not identified because the constant includes both ρ and the omitted second 
moments. In addition, the estimate of θ is inconsistent if the second moments are correlated with the 
instruments. See Carroll (2001) and Attanasio and Low (2004).  
6 GARCH(1,1) models yield negative weights for the long-term variances. Hull (2006, pp. 466-467) 





Figure 3. Bivariate EWMA Model
A. Consumption Volatility








B. Interest Rate Volatility








C. Covariance Consumption Growth/Interest Rate
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During the Civil War, consumption volatility rose more than fivefold from a prewar level of 
around 0.001 to above 0.005. Reflecting the deteriorating political and economic situation, 
consumption volatility started to rise three years before the outbreak of open hostilities. Between the 
Civil War and World War I, there were three peaks in consumption volatility – 1884, 1896-98 and 
1910 – which all coincided with severe financial crises. The economic contraction that started in 
1882 culminated in a financial panic in 1884. A growing scarcity of gold caused deflation, debtor 
insolvency and a financial panic in 1893. In response to falling commodity prices, a populist 
movement emerged that demanded government intervention in the economy and the monetization of 
silver to expand the money supply. Although this would have ended deflation, the immediate effect 
of the silver controversy, which climaxed during the Presidential election in 1896, was to create 
more financial uncertainty.
7 The financial crisis in 1907 was followed by rising consumption 
volatility. Consumption volatility also rose during the recession after World War I and during the 
Great Depression in the 1930s. World War II had no major impact on consumption volatility, and by 
the late 1950s consumption volatility had returned to the level that had prevailed before the Civil 
War. In the second half of the 20
th century, consumption volatility remained low, although there was 
a small increase after the second oil crisis. 
The volatility of the real interest rate rose markedly only in exceptional circumstances: the 
European revolutions in 1848 that affected the transatlantic credit market, the American Civil War, 
World War I, the political upheaval that led to the rise of totalitarian regimes in Europe in the 
interwar period, and World War II. The financial crises under the classical gold standard and the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary system all left no mark on the volatility of the 
real interest rate. Thus, financial crises did not destabilize the real interest rate, but credit markets 
were disrupted by political confrontations that threatened civic society.     
                                                 
7 Friedman and Schwartz (1963) investigate the political and economic ramifications of monetary 
and financial crises in the United States.      20
The covariance between consumption growth and the real interest rate measures the con-
sumption risk of government bonds.
8 Figure 3-C shows that the covariance between consumption 
growth and the real interest rate averages zero in the long-run. Therefore, government bonds yield 
the riskfree interest rate in the long-run. Although low consumption risk is an inherent quality of 
government bonds, in exceptional circumstances it may change, either positively or negatively. 
During the Civil War, investors faced the possibility that a bad outcome of the War would reduce 
consumption and, at the same time, government bonds would become worthless, providing no hedge 
against the fall in consumption. The positive conditional covariance between consumption growth 
and the real interest rate confirms that US government bonds were being perceived as a risky 
investment during the Civil War. In contrast, investors never lost confidence in the United States 
during both World Wars. Then, the conditional covariance between consumption growth and the real 
return on government bonds turned negative, indicating that US government bonds were viewed as a 
hedge against a fall in consumption. The same holds during the Great Depression, when deflation 
increased the real value of government bonds and bank failures and corporate bankruptcies affected 
the credit rating of private securities.   
Table 3 shows the estimated log-linear consumption Euler equation, using the same time periods 
as before. For the full sample period, two models are estimated: one including a dummy variable for 
the time after World War II and another including a trend instead of the dummy variable. The 
instruments include two lags of the inflation rate and two lags of each independent variable. The 
estimates confirm that the subjective discount rate, ρ, has declined since the 19
th century. Using all 
data from 1831 to 2004, the constant is 9.9 percent and the coefficient of the postwar dummy is 
minus 9.1 percent. Thus, ρ was 9.9 percent from 1831 until the end of World War II, and it has been 
 
                                                 
8 For an introduction to consumption based asset pricing see Cochrane (2005) and LeRoy and 
Werner (2001, Chapter 14).    21
 
 
  Table 3. Linear Regression - Estimated by Instrumental Variables 
   Dependent Variable: Real Interest Rate 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Independent Variable             1831-2004             1831-1929       1934-2004 
              (1)        (2)        (3)        (4) 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Consumption  growth   1.2839   1.2150   0.8591   0.7094 
     (0.5395)  (0.4990)  (0.5011)  (0.2569) 
  
  Covariance  consumption  43.9793 25.5651 36.5497 11.9728
# 
   growth/interest  rate    (8.7177) (7.2433) (8.3032) (20.6437) 
  
 Variance  of  consumption  -37.1246 -23.1281 -36.6051 -14.8933 
 growth     (9.4168)  (6.9710)  (9.9289)        (5.1299) 
 
 Constant    0.0991      0.1156   0.1181   0.0036
# 
     (0.0231)  (0.0182)  (0.0194)  (0.0087) 
  
 Postwar  dummy   -0.0905  
     (0.0195) 
  
 Trend       -0.0008 
       (0.0001) 
  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
J(4), J(5)      0.0304   0.0271   0.0267   0.0084 




The exogenous and predetermined variables include two lags of the inflation rate and two 
lags of each independent variable.   
The standard errors of coefficients are shown in brackets. Most coefficients are 
significant at the one percent level. Coefficients that are not significant at the ten percent 
level are marked with the superscript #. To correct for serial correlation, the standard 
errors are based on a Newey-West covariance matrix that was estimated with four lags. 
The bracket under the J statistic is the level of significance (p-value).  
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9.9-9.1 = 0.8 percent since then. Replacing the postwar dummy with a trend shows that ρ fell at an 
average rate of 0.08 percent per year between 1831 and 2004 (column 2). Splitting the sample period 
confirms this result (columns 3 and 4). Considering the impact of expected consumption growth, the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, θ, lies between 0.71 and 1.28 in the four regressions. The value 
of 1, which is used by Prescott (2006) and others, lies right in the middle of this range of estimates. 
The estimated coefficients of the second moments all carry the correct sign, but their absolute values 
are too large. If θ equals 1, the coefficient of the covariance between the real interest rate and con-
sumption growth should also be 1, and the coefficient of the variance of consumption growth should 
be  1(1 1) / 2 1. −+ = −  Instead, the estimated coefficients of the covariance lie between 12.0 and 44.0 
and the coefficients of the variance are between –14.9 and –37.1. Thus, shocks to the second 
moments affected the real interest rate much more than predicted by the second order approximation 
of the consumption Euler equation.  
The likely explanation for the strong effect of the second moments on the real interest rate is 
that these coefficients are biased because of some omitted variable that depressed the real interest 
rate during wars and emergencies. Adopting an idea of Rietz (1988), Barro (2006) proposed that rare 
disasters played a role in determining the real interest rate in the United States during the 20
th 
century.
9 The possibility of a disaster reduces the real interest rate because people prepare for 
disasters by saving more. Barro (2006, Section 6) conjectures that an increase in the perceived 
disaster probability accounted for the fall in the real interest rate during wars. Thus, the absolute 
values of the coefficients of the covariance and variance terms may be too large because the 
                                                 
9 Barro (1987) argued that military spending increased the real interest rate in Great Britain during 
wars, but Barro (1993, pp. 321-322) presented conflicting evidence on the United States, which, 
according to Romer (2006, p. 76), shows that “real interest rates appear to have been, if anything, 
generally lower during wars than in other periods.” Romer concludes that the “reasons for this 
anomalous behavior [of American interest rates] are not well understood.” Both this study and Barro 
(2006) leave no doubt that the real interest rate falls during wars.    23
omission of the perceived disaster probability from the regression equation produces biased 
estimates.   
Another explanation for the strong effect of the second moments on the real interest rate is that 
the log-linear Euler equation does not consider shocks to the marginal utility of consumption. A war, 
however, causes a temporary proportional downward shift of the period utility function. The utility 
function shifts downward because the horrors of war affect the welfare of consumers at every level 
of consumption. In addition, the composition of aggregate consumption changes, as some goods 
become unavailable and consumers shift away from goods whose prices skyrocket on the black 
market. During the oil crises, price controls and rationing reduced the availability of petrol for 
weekend outings and other enjoyable activities that require a car. Consumers save when marginal 
utility is temporarily low during a war or emergency, and they catch up by spending more when 
marginal utility recovers afterwards. This extra saving reduces the real interest rate during the war or 
emergency. In future research, it would be interesting to incorporate both ideas, that the perceived 
disaster probability increases and that marginal utility falls during wars and emergencies, into the 
log-linear consumption Euler equation. 
  
6. Conclusion 
The consumption Euler equation provides an equilibrium relationship between the real interest 
rate and the rate of consumption growth in dynamic macroeconomic models with microeconomic 
foundations. The real interest rate interacts positively with both the rate of consumption growth and 
the covariance between the interest rate and consumption growth, and it is negatively related to the 
variance of consumption growth. Therefore, the real interest rate is high during economic expansions 
and it is low or negative in periods of political and economic distress. A negative real interest rate 
was a common occurrence in US macroeconomic history. It became negative during every major war   24
and it was negative during the oil crises. Except for the Vietnam War, whose course was more drawn 
out than that of other conflicts, wars and national emergencies gave rise to consumer pessimism. 
People saved because they expected that per capita consumption would fall and because the volatility 
of consumption was high. Consumption was also postponed because the hardship of wars directly 
reduced marginal utility, and shortages and rationing affected the composite aggregate consumption 
good. It is also likely that the perceived probability of a disaster increased. For all these reasons, 
macroeconomic equilibrium required a negative real interest rate during wars and national 
emergencies. Without a negative real interest rate, there would have been excess saving and a 
corresponding excess supply of commodities.  
Alas, the interest rate mechanism does not work automatically. The zero bound on the nominal 
interest rate implies that there must be inflation when the equilibrium real interest rate is negative. 
The United States interfered with the gold standard during the Civil War and World War I and the 
gold standard was not operational during World War II, while the Bretton Woods system was 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate short-run inflation during the Korean War. By chance, the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system gave the Federal Reserve the power to inflate shortly before 
the first oil crisis. Inflation accommodated a negative equilibrium interest rate during every national 
emergency except the Great Depression. There is no doubt that the economic history of the 1930s 
would have been different if there had been a period of deliberate inflation and a negative real 
interest rate after the stock market crash of 1929. Instead, deflation put the negative equilibrium real 
interest rate out of reach until the rise in the official gold price led to inflation in 1934. For this 
reason, wars and national emergencies, which are easily identifiable economic shocks, produced 
normal business fluctuations, whereas the Great Depression became a national emergency without an 
obvious economic shock.    25
A growing literature, motivated by the recent occurrence of deflation and zero interest rates in 
Japan, deals with the conduct of monetary policy when the interest rate constraint is binding.
10 The 
problem is that standard open market purchases of government bonds by the central bank are 
ineffective because money and government bonds are perfect substitutes if the nominal interest rate 
is zero. American economic history shows how a ‘liquidity trap’ can be avoided when the 
equilibrium real interest rate is negative. The Federal Reserve (or national banks) contributed to the 
financing of wars and emergencies by buying Treasury bonds. During the Civil War, the Treasury 
also directly issued paper money, the so-called greenbacks. The monetization of government 
expenditures guaranteed the normal operation of financial markets because, even with a negative 
equilibrium real interest rate, the nominal interest rate did not fall to zero if there was sufficient 
inflation. However, the inflationary financing of rising government expenditure, which required 
interfering with the gold standard, was considered acceptable only in exceptional circumstances, 
during wars and national emergencies. During the Great Depression, President Herbert Hoover, who 
insisted on ‘sound’ budget principles, implemented one of the largest tax increases in American 
history to pay for Depression related public projects. In this, he had the support of the financial 
community, which, according to Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 322), rejected increases in 
government spending and monetary expansion as “greenbackism” and as being “inflationary”. Thus, 
the authorities knew that an expansion in government spending that is financed by the printing press 
would cause inflation, but, accepting the advice of financial circles, they let deflation run its course 
in order to safeguard the official gold price. The lesson from American economic history is that 
monetary policy targets, whether a fixed price of gold or a direct inflation target, should be 
abandoned when an adverse political or economic shock causes a decline in expected consumption 
and an increase in consumer uncertainty. The United States adopted a combination of increasing 
                                                 
10 See Krugman (1998), Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005), Jung et al. (2005), Wolman (2005), Adam 
and Billi (2006), Eggertsson (2006), Iwata and Wu (2006), and Kam (2006).    26
government spending and monetary expansion during every episode of negative equilibrium real 
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* See RATS User’s Guide, Example 7.2, and the RATS program file GIV.PRG.  
 
cal 1831 1 1 
all 0 2004:1 
 
open data 
data(format=RATS) / USRINT DUSPCRCON USINFL 
* REALINTEREST.RAT 
 
set USREALRET = USRINT+1 
set USCONGROW = DUSPCRCON+1 
 
* Exclude the Great Depression. 
 
set TREND = t 
set DEP = %IF(TREND<=103.AND.TREND>=100,%na,1.0) 
 
print 1928:1 1935:1 TREND DEP 
 
 ENTRY         TREND            DEP 
 1928:01          98              1 
 1929:01          99              1 
 1930:01         100            NA 
 1931:01         101            NA 
 1932:01         102            NA 
 1933:01         103            NA 
 1934:01         104              1 
 1935:01         105              1 
 
smpl 1831:1 2004:1 
 
nonlin discount riskaver 
frml h = dep(t)*(1+discount)**(-1)*usrealret(t)*uscongrow(t)**(-riskaver)-1 
compute discount = 0.02,riskaver = 1.1 
 
instruments constant uscongrow{1 to 2} usinfl{1 to 2} 
nlls(inst,frml=h,optimal,robusterrors,DAMP=1.0,LAGS=4) * / resid   33
 
Nonlinear Instrumental Variables - Estimation by Gauss-Newton 
Convergence in     7 Iterations. Final criterion was  0.0000017 <  0.0000100 
Annual Data From 1833:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations    168     Degrees of Freedom   166 
 Total Observations    172      Skipped/Missing        4 
Sum of Squared Residuals        3.0485154229 
J-Specification(3)                  0.646206 
Significance Level of J           0.88577770 
Durbin-Watson Statistic             1.811302 
 
   Variable                     Coeff       Std Error      T-Stat     Signif 
******************************************************************************* 
1.  DISCOUNT                 -0.021050725  0.017084780     -1.23213  0.21789932 
2.  RISKAVER                  2.949499163  0.976255903      3.02124  0.00251745 
 
*  Do specification tests on lag lengths 1, 2, 3 and 4. These are 
*  done over a common interval (the range supported by the four lag 
*  estimation - %regstart() returns the start entry from the last 
*  regression). The NLLS output is suppressed and the tests results 




dofor nlag = 1 2 3 4 
  instruments constant uscongrow{1 to nlag} usinfl{1 to nlag} 
  nlls(inst,noprint,frml=h,optimal,robusterrors,DAMP=1.0,LAGS=4) * start * 
  report(atcol=1,row=new) nlag %jstat %jsignif 
end dofor 
report(action=show) 
Lags    J-Stat        P-Value 
   1      0.012137      0.912275 
   2      0.646219      0.885775 
   3      3.949901      0.556651 
   4      4.684017      0.698460 
 
smpl 1831:1 1929:1 
 
nonlin discount riskaver 
frml h = dep(t)*(1+discount)**(-1)*usrealret(t)*uscongrow(t)**(-riskaver)-1 
compute discount = 0.02,riskaver = 1.1 
 
instruments constant uscongrow{1 to 2} usinfl{1 to 2} 
nlls(inst,frml=h,optimal,robusterrors,DAMP=1.0,LAGS=4) * 1833:1 1929:1 resid 
 
Nonlinear Instrumental Variables - Estimation by Gauss-Newton 
Convergence in    15 Iterations. Final criterion was  0.0000038 <  0.0000100 
Annual Data From 1833:01 To 1929:01 
Usable Observations     97     Degrees of Freedom    95 
Sum of Squared Residuals        0.3680579095 
J-Specification(3)                  2.993501 
Significance Level of J           0.39262823 
Durbin-Watson Statistic             0.827511 
 
   Variable                     Coeff       Std Error      T-Stat     Signif 
******************************************************************************* 
1.  DISCOUNT                 0.0663226629 0.0173463101      3.82345  0.00013160 
2.  RISKAVER                 0.1683842314 0.6394549966      0.26332  0.79230040 
   34
compute start=%regstart() 
report(action=define,hlabel=||'Lags','J-Stat','P-Value'||) 
dofor nlag = 1 2 3 4 
  instruments constant uscongrow{1 to nlag} usinfl{1 to nlag} 
  nlls(inst,noprint,frml=h,optimal,robusterrors,DAMP=1.0,LAGS=4) * start * 
  report(atcol=1,row=new) nlag %jstat %jsignif 
end dofor 
report(action=show) 
Lags    J-Stat        P-Value 
   1      0.595290      0.440381 
   2      2.993500      0.392628 
   3      3.261671      0.659715 
   4      3.550664      0.829830 
 
smpl 1934:1 2004:1 
 
nonlin discount riskaver 
frml h = (1+discount)**(-1)*usrealret(t)*uscongrow(t)**(-riskaver)-1 
compute discount = 0.02,riskaver = 1.1 
 
instruments constant uscongrow{1 to 2} usinfl{1 to 2} 
nlls(inst,frml=h,optimal,robusterrors,DAMP=1.0,LAGS=4) * / resid 
 
Nonlinear Instrumental Variables - Estimation by Gauss-Newton 
Convergence in    21 Iterations. Final criterion was  0.0000073 <  0.0000100 
Annual Data From 1934:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations     71     Degrees of Freedom    69 
Sum of Squared Residuals        0.0874250374 
J-Specification(3)                  3.298605 
Significance Level of J           0.34783679 
Durbin-Watson Statistic             0.593544 
 
   Variable                     Coeff       Std Error      T-Stat     Signif 
******************************************************************************* 
1.  DISCOUNT                 -0.007792058  0.010786261     -0.72241  0.47004500 




dofor nlag = 1 2 3 4 
  instruments constant uscongrow{1 to nlag} usinfl{1 to nlag} 
  nlls(inst,noprint,frml=h,optimal,robusterrors,DAMP=1.0,LAGS=4) * start * 
  report(atcol=1,row=new) nlag %jstat %jsignif 
end dofor 
report(action=show) 
Lags    J-Stat        P-Value 
   1      1.722130      0.189419 
   2      3.298606      0.347837 
   3      3.614145      0.606191 
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* See RATS User’s Guide, Chapter 12. 
 
cal 1831 1 1 
all 0 2004:1 
 
open data 
data(format=RATS) / DUSPCRCON 
* REALINTEREST.RAT 
 
set y = duspcrcon 
 
declare series u 
declare series h 
nonlin(parmset=meanparms) b0 
nonlin(parmset=garchparms) vc va vb 
 
frml resid = y - b0 
frml hf = vc + va*h{1} + vb*u{1}**2 
frml logl = (h(t)=hf(t)),(u(t)=resid(t)),-.5*(log(h(t))+u(t)**2/h(t)) 
 





set h = %seesq 
 
maximize(notrace,parmset=meanparms+garchparms,method=simplex,iters=15) logl 2 * 
 
MAXIMIZE - Estimation by Simplex 
Annual Data From 1832:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations    173 
Function Value                     468.00514387 
 
   Variable                     Coeff 
***************************************** 
1.  B0                             0.0208 
2.  VC                        -8.8959e-06 
3.  VA                             0.7656 
4.  VB                             0.3157 
 
maximize(notrace,parmset=meanparms+garchparms,method=bfgs,robusterrors,$ 
iters=100) logl 2 * 
 
MAXIMIZE - Estimation by BFGS 
Convergence in    15 Iterations. Final criterion was  0.0000000 <  0.0000100 
Annual Data From 1832:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations    173 
Function Value                     471.86775184 
 
   36
   Variable                     Coeff       Std Error      T-Stat     Signif 
******************************************************************************* 
1.  B0                             0.0196   2.3477e-03      8.33615  0.00000000 
2.  VC                        -2.0883e-05   6.3567e-06     -3.28516  0.00101923 
3.  VA                             0.9242       0.0579     15.95897  0.00000000 
4.  VB                             0.0837       0.0652      1.28378  0.19921814 
 
* The GARCH(1,1) model yields a negative weight for the long-term variance.  
* Therefore, it is best to switch to an EWMA model. Delete the vc terms in the 
* preceding program and replace vb with 1-va.  
 
declare series u 




frml resid = y - b0 
frml hf = va*h{1} + (1-va)*u{1}**2 
frml logl = (h(t)=hf(t)),(u(t)=resid(t)),-.5*(log(h(t))+u(t)**2/h(t)) 
 





set h = %seesq 
 
maximize(notrace,parmset=meanparms+garchparms,method=simplex,iters=5) logl 2 * 
 
MAXIMIZE - Estimation by Simplex 
Annual Data From 1832:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations    173 
Function Value                     470.50130404 
   Variable                     Coeff 
***************************************** 
1.  B0                       0.0192796234 
2.  VA                       0.8736962210 
 
maximize(notrace,parmset=meanparms+garchparms,method=bfgs,robusterrors, $ 
iters=100) logl 2 * 
 
MAXIMIZE - Estimation by BFGS 
Convergence in     3 Iterations. Final criterion was  0.0000053 <  0.0000100 
Annual Data From 1832:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations    173 
Function Value                     470.50130485 
   Variable                     Coeff       Std Error      T-Stat     Signif 
******************************************************************************* 
1.  B0                       0.0192805093 0.0019943607      9.66751  0.00000000 
2.  VA                       0.8736524367 0.0419249821     20.83847  0.00000000 
 
set VARCONRAW_A = u**2 
set VARCON_A = h 
 
dedit 
Editing data file "C:\Documents and Settings\eweber.BIZ\My Documents\Real 
Interest Rate\TEMPSTORAGE.RAT", 1 series 
include VARCON_A 
include VARCONRAW_A  ; save  ;  quit    37




* See RATS User’s Guide, Chapter 12. 
 
cal 1831 1 1 
all 0 2004:1 
open data 
data(format=RATS) / USRINT 
* REALINTEREST.RAT 
 
set y = usrint 
 
declare series u 
declare series h 
nonlin(parmset=meanparms) b0 
nonlin(parmset=garchparms) vc va vb 
 
frml resid = y - b0 
frml hf = vc + va*h{1} + vb*u{1}**2 
frml logl = (h(t)=hf(t)),(u(t)=resid(t)),-.5*(log(h(t))+u(t)**2/h(t)) 
 





set h = %seesq 
 
maximize(notrace,parmset=meanparms+garchparms,method=simplex,iters=5) logl 2 * 
 
MAXIMIZE - Estimation by Simplex 
Annual Data From 1832:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations    173 
Function Value                     420.07222171 
 
   Variable                     Coeff 
***************************************** 
1.  B0                       0.0362656475 
2.  VC                       0.0016848322 
3.  VA                       0.0110055017 
4.  VB                       0.2823469178 
 
maximize(notrace,parmset=meanparms+garchparms,method=bfgs,robusterrors, $ 
iters=100) logl 2 * 
 
MAXIMIZE - Estimation by BFGS 
Convergence in    20 Iterations. Final criterion was  0.0000050 <  0.0000100 
Annual Data From 1832:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations    173 
Function Value                     443.57012250 
 
   Variable                     Coeff       Std Error      T-Stat     Signif 
******************************************************************************* 
1.  B0                       0.0192413646 0.0025763615      7.46843  0.00000000 
2.  VC                       0.0000282777 0.0000646321      0.43752  0.66173605 
3.  VA                       0.4337129868 0.0898364385      4.82781  0.00000138 
4.  VB                       0.8100967300 0.2660590979      3.04480  0.00232835   38
 
* The sum of va and vb exceeds one, implying a negative weight for the long- 
* term variance. Therefore, it is best to switch to an EWMA model. Delete the 
* vc terms in the preceding program and replace vb with 1-va.  
 
declare series u 




frml resid = y - b0 
frml hf = va*h{1} + (1-va)*u{1}**2 
frml logl = (h(t)=hf(t)),(u(t)=resid(t)),-.5*(log(h(t))+u(t)**2/h(t)) 
 





set h = %seesq 
 
maximize(notrace,parmset=meanparms+garchparms,method=simplex,iters=5) logl 2 * 
 
MAXIMIZE - Estimation by Simplex 
Annual Data From 1832:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations    173 
Function Value                     434.25079658 
 
   Variable                     Coeff 
***************************************** 
1.  B0                       0.0191157821 
2.  VA                       0.5898507622 
 
maximize(notrace,parmset=meanparms+garchparms,method=bfgs,robusterrors, $ 
iters=100) logl 2 * 
 
MAXIMIZE - Estimation by BFGS 
Convergence in     3 Iterations. Final criterion was  0.0000033 <  0.0000100 
Annual Data From 1832:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations    173 
Function Value                     434.25079844 
 
   Variable                     Coeff       Std Error      T-Stat     Signif 
******************************************************************************* 
1.  B0                       0.0191169521 0.0011076665     17.25876  0.00000000 
2.  VA                       0.5899596328 0.0800734845      7.36773  0.00000000 
 
set VARINTRAW_A = u**2 
set VARINT_A = h 
 
dedit 
Editing data file "C:\Documents and Settings\eweber.BIZ\My Documents\Real 
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* This program estimates the multivariate GARCH(1,1) model developed by 
* Engle, JBES 2002, pp 339-350. The program is part of the RATS program file 
* GARCHMV.PRG, updated, March 2003. 
 
cal 1831 1 1 
all 0 2004:1 
 
open data 
data(format=RATS) / USRINT DUSPCRCON 
* REALINTEREST.RAT 
 
compute GSTART=1832:1 , GEND=2004:1 
 
* Parameters for the regression function 
 
dec vect[series] y(2) u(2) 
dec vect[frml] resid(2) 
set y(1) = duspcrcon 
set y(2) = usrint 
 
nonlin(parmset=MEANPARMS) B11 B21 
frml RESID(1) = (Y(1)-B11) 
frml RESID(2) = (Y(2)-B21) 
 
* Do initial regression. Copy initial values for regression parameters 
 
linreg(noprint) Y(1) / u(1) 
# constant 
 
compute B11 = %BETA(1) 
linreg(noprint) Y(2) / u(2) 
# constant 
 
compute B21 = %BETA(1) 
 





* h will have the sequence of variance estimates 
* uu will have the sequence of uu' matrices 
* 
declare symm[series] h(2,2) 
declare symm[series] uu(2,2) 
 
* hx and uux are used when extracting elements from h and uu. 
* ux is used when extracting a u vector 
 
declare symm hx(2,2) uux(2,2) 
declare vect ux(2) 
 
* This is used to initialize pre-sample variances. 
* If you want the pre-sample uu' to be the unconditional variance, 
* change the right side of the set uu(i,j) to rr(i,j) (same as h).   40
 
do i=1,2 
   do j=1,i 
      set h(i,j)  = rr(i,j) 
      set uu(i,j) = 0.0 
   end do j 
end do i 
 
* This is a standard log likelihood formula for any bivariate 
* ARCH, GARCH, ARCH-M,... The difference among these will be in 
* the definitions of HF and RESID. The function %XT pulls information 
 
* out of a matrix of SERIES, while %PT puts information into one. 
 
declare frml[symm] hf 
 
frml LOGL = $ 
    U(1) = RESID(1) , U(2) = RESID(2) ,$ 
    HX = HF(T) , $ 
    UX = %XT(U,T) , UUX = %OUTERXX(UX),$ 
    %PT(H,T,HX),%PT(UU,T,%OUTERXX(UX)),$ 
    %LOGDENSITY(HX,UX) 
 
* From here, the code is specific to the model of Engle. 
 
declare symm[series] q(2,2) 
declare symm qx(2,2) 
 
declare frml[symm] qf 
 
* Initialize the q sequence 
 
do i=1,2 
   do j=1,i 
      set q(i,j)  = rr(i,j) 
   end do j 
end do i 
 
dec vect vbv(2) vav(2) vcv(2) 
dec real a b 
 
* a and b are the parameters governing the "GARCH" process of the Q sequence 
 
nonlin(parmset=garchparms) vcv vbv vav a b 
 
frml qf = (qx=(1-a-b)*rr+a*%xt(uu,t-1)+b*%xt(q,t-1)),%pt(q,t,qx),qx 
frml hf = qf(t),rho=%if(a<1.and.b<1,qx(1,2)/sqrt(qx(1,1)*qx(2,2)),%na),$ 
          (h11=vcv(1)+vav(1)*h(1,1){1}+vbv(1)*uu(1,1){1}),$ 
          (h22=vcv(2)+vav(2)*h(2,2){1}+vbv(2)*uu(2,2){1}),$ 
          ||h11|rho*sqrt(h11*h22),h22|| 
 
* Initialize the c's to the diagonal elements of rr, others with typical values 
 
compute vcv=%xdiag(rr),vbv=%const(0.05),vav=%const(0.05), a=0.05, b=0.05 
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MAXIMIZE - Estimation by Simplex 
Annual Data From 1832:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations    173 
Function Value                     894.05583614 
 
   Variable                     Coeff 
***************************************** 
1.  B11                       0.024199293 
2.  B21                       0.022571748 
3.  VCV(1)                    0.000913983 
4.  VCV(2)                    0.000356264 
5.  VBV(1)                    0.660348185 
6.  VBV(2)                    0.681747674 
7.  VAV(1)                    0.107437098 
8.  VAV(2)                    0.258144977 
9.  A                         0.186828042 
10. B                        -0.059647890 
 
maximize(parmset=meanparms+garchparms,method=Bfgs,iters=100) LOGL GSTART GEND 
 
MAXIMIZE - Estimation by BFGS 
Convergence in    48 Iterations. Final criterion was  0.0000076 <  0.0000100 
Annual Data From 1832:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations    173 
Function Value                     916.73842735 
 
   Variable                     Coeff       Std Error      T-Stat     Signif 
******************************************************************************* 
1.  B11                            0.0193   2.1883e-03      8.80363  0.00000000 
2.  B21                            0.0192   1.6508e-03     11.65783  0.00000000 
3.  VCV(1)                    -2.0059e-05   6.3543e-06     -3.15674  0.00159542 
4.  VCV(2)                     2.5558e-05   3.5270e-05      0.72464  0.46867322 
5.  VBV(1)                         0.1051       0.0542      1.93948  0.05244289 
6.  VBV(2)                         0.7760       0.1865      4.16115  0.00003166 
7.  VAV(1)                         0.9079       0.0441     20.56908  0.00000000 
8.  VAV(2)                         0.4513       0.0752      6.00391  0.00000000 
9.  A                              0.0570       0.0521      1.09481  0.27359923 
10. B                              0.8458       0.1421      5.95225  0.00000000 
 
* The GARCH(1,1) model yields a negative weight for the long-term variance of  
* consumption. Therefore, the model is reestimated as an EWMA model.  
 
declare symm[series] q(2,2) 
declare symm qx(2,2) 
* 
declare frml[symm] qf 
 
* Initialize the q sequence 
 
do i=1,2 
   do j=1,i 
      set q(i,j)  = rr(i,j) 
   end do j 
end do i 
 
dec vect vav(2) 
dec real a b 
 
* a and b are the parameters governing the "GARCH" process of the Q sequence   42
 
nonlin(parmset=garchparms) vav a b 
 
frml qf = (qx=(1-a-b)*rr+a*%xt(uu,t-1)+b*%xt(q,t-1)),%pt(q,t,qx),qx 
frml hf = qf(t),rho=%if(a<1.and.b<1,qx(1,2)/sqrt(qx(1,1)*qx(2,2)),%na),$ 
          (h11=vav(1)*h(1,1){1}+(1-vav(1))*uu(1,1){1}),$ 
          (h22=vav(2)*h(2,2){1}+(1-vav(2))*uu(2,2){1}),$ 
          ||h11|rho*sqrt(h11*h22),h22|| 
* Initialize the c's to the diagonal elements of rr, others with typical values 
 
compute vav=%const(0.5),a=0.05,b=0.05 
maximize(notrace,parmset=meanparms+garchparms,method=SIMPLEX,iters=10) LOGL $ 
GSTART GEND 
 
MAXIMIZE - Estimation by Simplex 
Annual Data From 1832:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations    173 
Function Value                     905.41315267 
 
   Variable                     Coeff 
***************************************** 
1.  B11                      0.0192788522 
2.  B21                      0.0189713256 
3.  VAV(1)                   0.8685713155 
4.  VAV(2)                   0.5918197101 
5.  A                        0.0532379515 
6.  B                        0.0164683129 
 
maximize(parmset=meanparms+garchparms,method=Bfgs,iters=100) LOGL GSTART GEND 
 
MAXIMIZE - Estimation by BFGS 
Convergence in    14 Iterations. Final criterion was  0.0000091 <  0.0000100 
Annual Data From 1832:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations    173 
Function Value                     906.47610423 
 
   Variable                     Coeff       Std Error      T-Stat     Signif 
******************************************************************************* 
1.  B11                      0.0190434927 0.0023084547      8.24945  0.00000000 
2.  B21                      0.0189947453 0.0013322550     14.25759  0.00000000 
3.  VAV(1)                   0.8703428021 0.0313307612     27.77918  0.00000000 
4.  VAV(2)                   0.5879949672 0.0560446332     10.49155  0.00000000 
5.  A                        0.0452195167 0.0427792692      1.05704  0.29049207 
6.  B                        0.8469252926 0.1478434537      5.72853  0.00000001 
 
set VARCON_B = h(1,1) 
set VARINT_B = h(2,2) 
set COVAR_B = h(2,1) 
 
set VARCONRAW_B = UU(1,1) 
set VARINTRAW_B = UU(2,2) 
set COVARRAW_B = UU(2,1) 
 
dedit 
Editing data file "C:\Documents and Settings\eweber.BIZ\My Documents\Real 
Interest Rate\TEMPSTORAGE.RAT", 5 series 
include VARCONRAW_B 
include VARCON_B 














cal 1831 1 1 
all 0 2004:1 
 
open data 
data(format=RATS) / USRINT DUSPCRCON USINFL COVAR_B VARCON_B 
* REALINTEREST.RAT 
* Exclude Great Depression. 
 
set TREND = t 
set DEP = %if(TREND<=103.and.TREND>=100,%na,1.0) 
set DUSPCRCONDEP = DUSPCRCON*DEP 









linreg(robusterrors,damp=1.0,lags=4) USRINT 1831:1 2004:1 
# CONSTANT POSTWAR DUSPCRCONDEP COVAR_B VARCON_B 
 
Linear Regression - Estimation by Least Squares 
Dependent Variable USRINT 
Annual Data From 1831:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations    170     Degrees of Freedom   165 
 Total Observations    174      Skipped/Missing        4 
Centered R**2     0.385403      R Bar **2   0.370503 
Uncentered R**2   0.533350      T x R**2      90.670 
Mean of Dependent Variable      0.0343334448 
Std Error of Dependent Variable 0.0611561802 
Standard Error of Estimate      0.0485218214 
Sum of Squared Residuals        0.3884705808 
Durbin-Watson Statistic             0.996681 
 
   Variable                     Coeff       Std Error      T-Stat     Signif 
******************************************************************************* 
1.  Constant                   0.10419824   0.01524908      6.83308  0.00000000 
2.  POSTWAR                   -0.07873592   0.01293349     -6.08775  0.00000000 
3.  DUSPCRCONDEP               0.18964016   0.12568681      1.50883  0.13134198 
4.  COVAR_B                   42.71032275   6.68796120      6.38615  0.00000000 
5.  VARCON_B                 -29.28436767   6.46814586     -4.52747  0.00000597 
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linreg(robusterrors,damp=1.0,lags=4) USRINT 1831:1 2004:1 
# CONSTANT TREND DUSPCRCONDEP COVAR_B VARCON_B 
 
Linear Regression - Estimation by Least Squares 
Dependent Variable USRINT 
Annual Data From 1831:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations    170     Degrees of Freedom   165 
 Total Observations    174      Skipped/Missing        4 
Centered R**2     0.433829      R Bar **2   0.420103 
Uncentered R**2   0.570119      T x R**2      96.920 
Mean of Dependent Variable      0.0343334448 
Std Error of Dependent Variable 0.0611561802 
Standard Error of Estimate      0.0465710060 
Sum of Squared Residuals        0.3578616693 
Durbin-Watson Statistic             1.048942 
   Variable                     Coeff       Std Error      T-Stat     Signif 
******************************************************************************* 
1.  Constant                   0.11654680   0.01048051     11.12034  0.00000000 
2.  TREND                     -0.00066277   0.00007586     -8.73642  0.00000000 
3.  DUSPCRCONDEP               0.22516529   0.13505025      1.66727  0.09546065 
4.  COVAR_B                   28.47450132   5.47502751      5.20080  0.00000020 
5.  VARCON_B                 -18.04691279   5.00322772     -3.60705  0.00030969 
 
linreg(robusterrors,damp=1.0,lags=4) USRINT 1831:1 1929:1 
# CONSTANT DUSPCRCON COVAR_B VARCON_B 
 
Linear Regression - Estimation by Least Squares 
Dependent Variable USRINT 
Annual Data From 1831:01 To 1929:01 
Usable Observations     99     Degrees of Freedom    95 
Centered R**2     0.354375      R Bar **2   0.333987 
Uncentered R**2   0.638938      T x R**2      63.255 
Mean of Dependent Variable      0.0579686679 
Std Error of Dependent Variable 0.0656295695 
Standard Error of Estimate      0.0535600401 
Sum of Squared Residuals        0.2725244006 
Durbin-Watson Statistic             1.236058 
 
   Variable                     Coeff       Std Error      T-Stat     Signif 
******************************************************************************* 
1.  Constant                   0.12151879   0.01497127      8.11680  0.00000000 
2.  DUSPCRCON                  0.16052947   0.14413444      1.11375  0.26538725 
3.  COVAR_B                   40.81479185   7.91612717      5.15590  0.00000025 
4.  VARCON_B                 -33.13730446   8.22700441     -4.02787  0.00005628 
 
linreg(robusterrors,damp=1.0,lags=4) USRINT 1934:1 2004:1 
# CONSTANT DUSPCRCON COVAR_B VARCON_B 
 
Linear Regression - Estimation by Least Squares 
Dependent Variable USRINT 
Annual Data From 1934:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations     71     Degrees of Freedom    67 
Centered R**2     0.301285      R Bar **2   0.269999 
Uncentered R**2   0.302497      T x R**2      21.477 
Mean of Dependent Variable      0.0013772886 
Std Error of Dependent Variable 0.0332836828 
Standard Error of Estimate      0.0284376026 
Sum of Squared Residuals        0.0541827150 
Durbin-Watson Statistic             0.769640   45
 
   Variable                     Coeff       Std Error      T-Stat     Signif 
******************************************************************************* 
1.  Constant                   0.00865582   0.00646068      1.33977  0.18032054 
2.  DUSPCRCON                  0.42289856   0.14627175      2.89118  0.00383793 
3.  COVAR_B                    8.93452955  17.34118655      0.51522  0.60639916 









instruments CONSTANT POSTWAR USINFL{1 to 2} DUSPCRCONDEP{1 to 2} $  
VARCON_B{1 to 2} COVAR_B{1 to 2} 
 
linreg(inst,robusterrors,damp=1.0,lags=4) USRINT 1831:1 2004:1 
# CONSTANT POSTWAR DUSPCRCONDEP COVAR_B VARCON_B 
 
Linear Regression - Estimation by Instrumental Variables 
Dependent Variable USRINT 
Annual Data From 1831:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations    166     Degrees of Freedom   161 
 Total Observations    174      Skipped/Missing        8 
Centered R**2    -0.190566      R Bar **2  -0.220145 
Uncentered R**2   0.094917      T x R**2      15.756 
Mean of Dependent Variable      0.0342444420 
Std Error of Dependent Variable 0.0611585189 
Standard Error of Estimate      0.0675558053 
Sum of Squared Residuals        0.7347696804 
J-Specification(5)                  0.030420 
Significance Level of J           0.99999151 
Durbin-Watson Statistic             1.567679 
 
   Variable                     Coeff       Std Error      T-Stat     Signif 
******************************************************************************* 
1.  Constant                   0.09909716   0.02307490      4.29459  0.00001750 
2.  POSTWAR                   -0.09048953   0.01954751     -4.62921  0.00000367 
3.  DUSPCRCONDEP               1.28388967   0.53945008      2.38000  0.01731277 
4.  COVAR_B                   43.97934168   8.71770707      5.04483  0.00000045 
5.  VARCON_B                 -37.12456776   9.41678162     -3.94238  0.00008068 
 
instruments CONSTANT TREND USINFL{1 to 2} DUSPCRCONDEP{1 to 2} $ 
VARCON_B{1 to 2} COVAR_B{1 to 2} 
 
linreg(inst,robusterrors,damp=1.0,lags=4) USRINT 1831:1 2004:1 
# CONSTANT TREND DUSPCRCONDEP COVAR_B VARCON_B 
 
Linear Regression - Estimation by Instrumental Variables 
Dependent Variable USRINT 
Annual Data From 1831:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations    166     Degrees of Freedom   161 
 Total Observations    174      Skipped/Missing        8 
Centered R**2    -0.021584      R Bar **2  -0.046965 
Uncentered R**2   0.223379      T x R**2      37.081 
Mean of Dependent Variable      0.0342444420 
Std Error of Dependent Variable 0.0611585189   46
Standard Error of Estimate      0.0625781961 
Sum of Squared Residuals        0.6304809315 
J-Specification(5)                  0.027053 
Significance Level of J           0.99999366 
Durbin-Watson Statistic             1.679707 
 
   Variable                     Coeff       Std Error      T-Stat     Signif 
******************************************************************************* 
1.  Constant                   0.11564949   0.01823828      6.34103  0.00000000 
2.  TREND                     -0.00077342   0.00013395     -5.77373  0.00000001 
3.  DUSPCRCONDEP               1.21499793   0.49895462      2.43509  0.01488821 
4.  COVAR_B                   25.56509746   7.24327219      3.52950  0.00041635 
5.  VARCON_B                 -23.12806165   6.97100943     -3.31775  0.00090746 
 
instruments CONSTANT USINFL{1 to 2} DUSPCRCON{1 to 2} VARCON_B{1 to 2} $ 
COVAR_B{1 to 2} 
 
linreg(inst,robusterrors,damp=1.0,lags=4) USRINT 1831:1 1929:1 
# CONSTANT DUSPCRCON COVAR_B VARCON_B 
 
Linear Regression - Estimation by Instrumental Variables 
Dependent Variable USRINT 
Annual Data From 1831:01 To 1929:01 
Usable Observations     97     Degrees of Freedom    93 
 Total Observations     99      Skipped/Missing        2 
Centered R**2     0.074227      R Bar **2   0.044363 
Uncentered R**2   0.474348      T x R**2      46.012 
Mean of Dependent Variable      0.0572204465 
Std Error of Dependent Variable 0.0659257730 
Standard Error of Estimate      0.0644468485 
Sum of Squared Residuals        0.3862658542 
J-Specification(5)                  0.026736 
Significance Level of J           0.99999384 
Durbin-Watson Statistic             1.599709 
 
   Variable                     Coeff       Std Error      T-Stat     Signif 
******************************************************************************* 
1.  Constant                   0.11807147   0.01944620      6.07170  0.00000000 
2.  DUSPCRCON                  0.85911397   0.50108980      1.71449  0.08643859 
3.  COVAR_B                   36.54969109   8.30322612      4.40187  0.00001073 
4.  VARCON_B                 -36.60505462   9.92890170     -3.68672  0.00022717 
 
instruments CONSTANT USINFL{1 to 2} DUSPCRCON{1 to 2} VARCON_B{1 to 2} $ 
COVAR_B{1 to 2} 
 
linreg(inst,robusterrors,damp=1.0,lags=4) USRINT 1934:1 2004:1 
# CONSTANT DUSPCRCON COVAR_B VARCON_B 
 
Linear Regression - Estimation by Instrumental Variables 
Dependent Variable USRINT 
Annual Data From 1934:01 To 2004:01 
Usable Observations     71     Degrees of Freedom    67 
Centered R**2     0.248235      R Bar **2   0.214574 
Uncentered R**2   0.249538      T x R**2      17.717 
Mean of Dependent Variable      0.0013772886 
Std Error of Dependent Variable 0.0332836828 
Standard Error of Estimate      0.0294974193 
Sum of Squared Residuals        0.0582965488 
J-Specification(5)                  0.008440   47
Significance Level of J           0.99999965 
Durbin-Watson Statistic             0.942065 
 
   Variable                     Coeff       Std Error      T-Stat     Signif 
******************************************************************************* 
1.  Constant                   0.00357732   0.00868356      0.41196  0.68036586 
2.  DUSPCRCON                  0.70943756   0.25692837      2.76123  0.00575846 
3.  COVAR_B                   11.97276687  20.64369496      0.57997  0.56193344 









cal 1830 1 1 
all 0 2004:1 
 
open data 




set USRINT = USRINT*100 
set DUSPCRCONGDP = DUSPCRCONGDP*100 
set USINFL = USINFL*100 
set TREND = t 
 
set EMERGENCIES = 
%if(TREND>=1861:1.and.TREND<=1865:1.or.TREND>=1917:1.and.TREND<=1918:1 $ 
  .or.TREND>=1929:1.and.TREND<=1933:1.or.TREND>=1942:1.and.TREND<=1945:1 $ 
  .or.TREND>=1950:1.and.TREND<=1953:1.or.TREND>=1973:1.and.TREND<=1980:1 $ 
  .or.TREND>=2001:1,1,0) 
 
spgraph(vfields=2) 
  graph(shading=EMERGENCIES,header='Figure 1. Real Interest Rate', $ 
    subheader='1831-2004') 1 
  # USRINT 1830:1 2004:1 
  graph(shading=EMERGENCIES,header='Figure 2. Inflation Rate', $ 
    SUBHEADER='1831 - 2004') 1 
  # USINFL 1830:1 2004:1 
spgraph(done) 
 
grparm(bold) header 15 
spgraph(samesize,header='Figure 3. Bivariate EWMA Model',vfields=3) 
  grparm(bold) header 20 
  graph(max=0.006,vticks=6,shading=EMERGENCIES, $ 
    header='A. Consumption Volatility') 1 
  # VARCON_B 1830:1 2004:1 
  set UNIVARIATE = VARINT_A 
  set BIVARIATE = VARINT_B 
  graph(shading=EMERGENCIES,header='B. Interest Rate Volatility') 1 
  # VARINT_B 1830:1 2004:1 
  graph(MAX=0.005,shading=EMERGENCIES, $ 
    header='C. Covariance Consumption Growth/Interest Rate') 1 
  # COVAR_B 1830:1 2004:1 
spgraph(done) 